Securities Litigation in State Courts—Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed by Branson, Douglas M.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 76 
Issue 2 The Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
January 1998 
Securities Litigation in State Courts—Something Old, Something 
New, Something Borrowed 
Douglas M. Branson 
University of Pittsburgh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Douglas M. Branson, Securities Litigation in State Courts—Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 509 (1998). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
SECURITIES LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS-
SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW,
SOMETHING BORROWED ....
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON*
Using an old marital saying to title this Article may mislead. In particular,
owing to federal legislative attempts to preempt state securities law actions,
all may not be, or remain, bliss in the state courts.
Yet, in an article I recently published about the plight of securities action
plaintiffs in the federal courts, I used a martial metaphor, the gauntlet.'
Federal judges, legislators and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 ("Reform Act" or "PSLRA")2 have created a number of cudgels with
which defendants can rain blows down on any plaintiff seeking to proceed to
the federal courthouse door. I concluded in that article, "Because of the many
instruments that now exist with which blows can be administered, only the
toughest plaintiff who can be swift at times and crafty at others and who has
an extraordinarily meritorious suit, generous funding, the most able of
counsel, and extreme staying power will survive.",3 The gauntlet has
lengthened, and many a plaintiff will receive a crippling blow along the way.
Potential plaintiffs face the following possible blows: the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine; requirements that fraud be pleaded with particularity;
special and strict state of mind pleading standards; effective elimination of
professional and semiprofessional plaintiffs; a mandatory quest for the "most
appropriate plaintiff'; mandatory Rule 11 review of plaintiffs' pleadings; the
specter of shifting enormous defense legal fees onto plaintiffs; mandatory
stays on discovery by plaintiffs; and on and on. These are "reforms" intended
to intimidate. A gauntlet exists. Every federal plaintiff must run it: "each anti-
plaintiff development or device [represents] a cudgel that defense lawyers
will use, and they will use them in every case, not just in marginal and
frivolous ones.' 4
In some states, plaintiffs' lawyers turned to state courts long before the
era of federal reform.5 Unlike the federal statutory scheme, state securities
* W. Edward Sell Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
1. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now
Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 3 (1996)
[hereinafter Branson, Gauntlet].
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3. Branson, Gauntlet, supra note 1, at 4.
4. Id. at 5.
5. One experienced plaintiff's attorney told me that for the past several years he has gone
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laws commonly provide the prevailing plaintiff with an award of attorneys'
fees.6 State substantive "blue sky" law also may be more favorable, allowing
damages in cases of mere negligence,7 or requiring express liability for key
secondary defendants. 8 Post-PSLRA attorneys turn to state courts to avoid
heightened pleading standards or discovery stays that the PSLRA imposes on
federal court claims.9 In another post-Reform Act article, I describe some of
the obvious means by which securities claims plaintiffs may pursue their
cases in state court.'
0
The reformers, however, are at it again. They now propose legislation that
would preempt state court class actions involving nationally traded
securities," or, under an extreme measure, require all securities fraud suits,
not just class actions, to be litigated exclusively in federal court. 2 Even
though they involve "overkill heaped upon overkill," these federal
exclusively to state court because he and his partners have regarded their home state's securities laws
as much "friendlier." In addition, they avoid class actions because they feel they have much more
control over the case when they represent a number of named plaintiffs. Interview with Kim T.
Buckley, partner of Esler, Stephens & Buckley, in Portland, Or. (Dec. 8, 1997); see also Marc I.
Steinberg, The Texas Securities Act: A Plaintiff's Preferred Route?, 58 TEX. B.J. 1096 (1995).
6. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.930(a) (Michie 1994) (awarding "reasonable attorneys' fees");
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-2001A (1994 & Supp. 1997) ("taxable courts costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees"); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33, § D(7) (West 1964 & Supp. 1998). See
generally Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 1027, 1028 (1992) [hereinafter Branson, Collateral Participant Liability (State)].
7. See State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604, 607 (Ariz. 1980); Pottem v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc.,
589 P.2d 1378, 1379 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978): State ex rel. Mays v. Ridenhour, 811 P.2d 1220, 1232-33
(Kan. 1991): Fakhrdai v. Mason, 696 P.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1985): Kittilson v. Ford, 608
P.2d 264, 265 (Wash. 1980); State v. Temby, 322 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982). See
generally Branson, Collateral Participant Liability (State), supra note 6, at 1046-47.
8. Express secondary liability under the Uniform Securities Act includes: "[e]very person who
directly or indirectly controls a seller liable [under the Act], every partner, officer, or director of such a
seller, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of
such seller who materially aids in the sale .... UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b), 7B U.L.A. 643
(1985). See generally Douglas M. Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional Afier the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. REV. 91, 120-21 (1996) [hereinafter Branson,
Chasing the Rogue Professional].
9. One study found state court class action filings up 26%. See Joseph Grundfest & Michael
Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience, in 29TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 243 (1997). In contrast, a study by National Economic Research Associates
Inc. ("NERA") found 1997 state court filings consistent with the five years preceding the PSLRA,
leading to the conclusion that "any migration of class suits to state courts was transitory." Congress
Targets 'Loophole' in 1995 Act Barring Vexatious Suits, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1211, 1212
(Aug. 29, 1997). State courts have also refused to stay litigation on grounds that it is a naked attempt
to evade the PSLRA pleading and discovery stay provisions. See, e.g., In re Oak Tech. Secs. Litig.,
1997 WL 448168, at *4-*9 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 1997).
10. See Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional, supra note 8, at 115-25.
II. See H.R. 1689, 105th CONG. (1997).
12. See H.R. 1653, 105th CONG. (1997); see also Rachel Witmer, White, Eshoo Introduce
Securities Bill That Would Federalize Private Class Suits, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 694 (May
23, 1997) (proposing legislation by Representative Tom Campbell of California).
[VOL. 76:509
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/3
SECURITIES LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS
preemption efforts are seeing the full light of legislative day. 13 Nonetheless,
these preemption efforts cause a largely proplaintiff advocate such as I to
continue to examine state law. What additional legal theories might a
plaintiff pursue in state court? Preemption efforts might not close all avenues.
Also, the existing judicial and Reform Act measures make federal court
an inhospitable place for any securities claim, whether it involves a public
company or smaller deals to which the PSLRA does not apply.1 4 I would
advise any lawyer less schooled in securities litigation, and even more
experienced lawyers who nonetheless lack the resources and credibility of a
Milberg Weiss,' 5 to pursue claims in state rather than federal court.
Knowledge of additional state law theories they might pursue cannot help but
be a benefit.
If preemption efforts succeed, one of the theories I explore will remain
useful in the publicly held arena. Both the SEC General Counsel and
members of the Delaware Bar are working, unopposed, to carve an
exemption to preemption legislation that will preserve state law causes of
action premised on state law duties of disclosure, formerly known in
Delaware as the duty of "candor"' 16 and still called by that name in the few
other jurisdictions with authority on the subject.
Other theories, common-law fraud and, in particular, constructive fraud,
have evolved, and possess greater utility than commonly believed. These
theories, however, probably remain useful only in smaller cases such as those
involving private placement and intrastate offerings or nonrepresentative
(nonclass) actions, whether preemption efforts succeed or not.
13. One SEC Commissioner, Steven Wallman, has publicly supported preemption as a "good
idea." SEC Commissioner Wallman Sees Need for Uniform Standards Law, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1259, 1259 (Sept. 12, 1997); cf Justices Hear Arguments on Viability of Misappropriation
Theory of Insider Trading. 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 522, 523 (Apr. 18, 1997) (quoting SEC
chair Arthur Levitt as stating "it is premature to propose legislative changes"); SEC, Private Bar
Working to Address Flaw in Litigation Reform Bills, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 170 (Jan. 30,
1998) (stating Commissioner Norman Johnson opposes any form of preemption).
14. Accord William S. Lerach, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995-22 Months Later,
Address to USX Fall Law Conference, Oct. 18-19, 1997, at 20 (stating that "in the Northern District of
California... every motion to dismiss a New Act complaint has been granted") (on file with author).
15. Milberg Weiss, a 130 lawyer firm with offices in New York and San Diego, was lead counsel
in 65 of 210 (31%) and 57 of 147 (39%) federal securities class actions settling in 1995 and 1996,
respectively. The firm recovered an estimated $3 billion in the past 10 years. With its experience and
access to potential plaintiffs with large shareholdings, predictions are that Milberg Weiss will
dominate the field even more in the post-Reform Act era. See Dean Starkman, Milberg Weiss Still
Reigns in Holder Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1997, at B6.
16. See, e.g., SEC, Private Bar Working to Address Flaw in Litigation Reform Bills, supra note
13, at 169-71 ("It is therefore highly unlikely that the pending securities litigation reform legislation-
backed by Wall Street, the accounting profession, and the high tech and venture capital industries-
would be enacted without the changes necessary to preserve this body of [Delaware] precedent.").
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State law common law also includes theories of secondary liability, in
particular, aiding and abetting violations of fiduciary duties. Given the
abolition of aiding and abetting and other implied add-on theories of
secondary liability in the federal area by the United States Supreme Court in
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,17 and the potential expansion of the
duty of candor, which is after all a duty denominated as fiduciary, state
common-law aiding and abetting theories may become another state law
growth area.
These three theories--common-law and constructive fraud, the duty of
disclosure (candor) and aiding and abetting-are the "something old,
something new, something borrowed ..... They may provide comfort, if not
outright success, to plaintiffs in some forms of state court securities litigation.
I. SOMETHING OLD: COMMON-LAW FRAUD-HOW HAS IT EVOLVED?
A. Introduction and Overview
Many securities lawyers viewed common-law causes of action, including
fraud and misrepresentation, as if those lawyers were caught in a Victorian
time warp. Some continued to examine the House of Lords 1889 decision on
directors' liability for a false prospectus, Derry v. Peek,18 or the 1873
decision in Peek v. Gurney.'9 Peek refused to hold directors liable for fraud
because the plaintiff purchased his shares on an anonymous stock exchange.
The privity the common law required was therefore lacking. Common-law
fraud was thought to be a complex cause of action requiring a plaintiff to
allege and prove eight or nine distinct elements. 20 Most knowledgeable
lawyers thought it better to bypass common-law fraud, relying instead on the
SEC's catchall antifraud provision, Rule lOb-5.
In securities law, lawyers thought the common-law action had several
sticking points. First, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant uttered the
17. 511 U.S. 164(1994).
18. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
19. 6 L.R.-E. & I. App. 377 (1873).
20. See, for example, McAnallyv. Gildersleeve, 16 F.3d 1493, 1497 (8th Cir. 1994), stating:
To recover under common-law fraud, the plaintiff must prove a "false representation of a material
fact with knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false. The false
representation must be made with the intent to induce the other party to rely upon that
representation." Specifically, this circuit requires a finding of scienter, i.e., the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant knew that the misrepresentation was false when made. The
plaintiff also must demonstrate that any damage "resulted from his justifiable reliance on the
defendant's misrepresentation." Justifiable reliance requires that the plaintiffs actually relied on
the misrepresentations, and that this reliance was reasonable.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
[VOL. 76:509
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misrepresentation or half-truth knowing of its falsity and with intent that the
misrepresentation be acted upon by the person to whom it has been made
(high degree of scienter).21 Second, the privity requirement limited the
usefulness of common-law fraud: the plaintiff could recover only from those
with whom she had had dealings (transactional privity). Third, a plaintiff had
to prove that she relied upon the misrepresentation or half-truth and that such
reliance was reasonable (strict reliance requirement).
But are these historical barriers still in place? As the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, along with state blue sky
laws, relegated common-law fraud securities to obscurity, have common-law
courts relaxed or modified these elements? Has common-law fraud made a
comeback on those three key issues (scienter, privity and reliance)? The
answer to the question on each issue respectively is yes, yes and perhaps.
B. State of Mind Requirements
In the federal area, Mr. Justice Powell began his Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder2 2 opinion with the question of whether a Rule lOb-5 action for
damages "may lie ... in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. 23 However, his discussion of the issue involved
whether negligent conduct is sufficient and not whether a Rule 1Ob-5
plaintiff must allege and prove intent, as in older cases of common-law fraud.
By footnote, the Justice left for another day the question of whether
allegations of recklessness would suffice. 4
After Hochfelder, all the federal circuits that addressed the issue held that
recklessness,25 or at least recklessness evincing a conscious disregard or an
extreme departure from ordinary care, or what Mr. Justice Holmes termed
21. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 741
(5th ed. 1984). Prosser and Keeton stated:
The intent which underlies an intentional misrepresentation is a more complex matter than the
relatively simple intention in the case of assault and battery. It involves the intent that a
representation shall be made, that it shall be directed to a particular person or class of persons, that
it shall convey a certain meaning, that it shall be believed, and that is shall be acted upon in a
certain way... In addition, there is the intent to accomplish an ultimate purpose, as to benefit the
speaker, or to cause harm to the one addressed.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
22. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
23. Id. at 187-88.
24. See id. at 193 n.12 (stating "we need not address here the question whether, in some
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability").
25. See, e.g., Don J. McDermett, Jr., Note, Liabiliy for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule
I0b-5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1100-03 (1984)
(presenting a circuit by circuit analysis).
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 76:509
"recklessness dishonesty," 26 would suffice.27
Now enters the PSLRA of 1995, with its heightened pleading standard.
Plaintiffs must state "with particularity" facts giving rise to a "strong
inference" that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind.28 Federal
judges are misreading the Reform Act, holding that the pleading standard
eliminates recklessness of any sort as a ground for liability. Several cases
have held that plaintiffs must plead and prove intentional or knowing
misconduct. 29 Only a minority of federal judges seems to get it right: they
have been careful to distinguish between a change in the pleading standard,
which has occurred, and a change in the substantive law, which has not.
30
And, of course, defendant's fault, or state of mind, and the pleading of it, are
the heart of any securities or other fraud case.
3 1
All of this sets the stage for a discussion of state of mind in common-law
fraud cases.32 In state courts, no heightened pleading standard exists. In states
adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[m]alice, intent, knowledge,
and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally,' 33 that is,
the pleading standard which prevailed in federal court before the PSLRA.
That is the procedure. In terms of substance, beginning with Hochfelder,
26. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 130-38 (1881).
27. See Douglas M. Branson, Statutory Securities Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder Era: The
Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysis, 52 TUL. L. REV. 50, 87 (1977) (stating that "many
refinements of gross negligence into various gradations are possible").
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
29. The leading case is In re Silicon Graphics. Inc. Securities Litigation, (1996-1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,325 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996), in which Judge Smith dismissed
a complaint alleging that insiders "devised a scheme to boost stock prices to protect [their own]
interests." Id. at 99,959; see also Hockey v. Medhekar, 1997 WL 203704 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1997)
(holding that recklessness does not suffice); Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(holding that higher actual knowledge standard was adequately alleged); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic,
Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that "plaintiff must set forth specific facts that
constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants").
30. See, e.g., Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. III. 1997); Zeid v. Kimberley,
930 F. Supp. 431, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that "a plaintiff can allege 'facts constituting
circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior' (citation omitted)); Marksman
Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 & n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that
there exists "no basis to conclude that Congress altered the mental state requirement" and
"recklessness can constitute scienter").
31. See, e.g., Panelists Dispute Reform Law's Impact on Private Class Securities Fraud
Litigation, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1134, 1135 (May 15, 1997) (quoting William Lerach, "The
pleading standard was intended to be a 'gatekeeper"' by providing a hostile judge assisted by clever
lawyers with a complete weapon to block any case, no matter how meritorious).
32. Of course, under state blue sky laws, a fair number of courts have held that, because the
antifraud language is statutory rather than an agency rule such as Rule IOb-5, allegation and proof of
negligence will ground a damage recovery. See supra note 7.
33. FED. R- CIV. P. 9(b). Overall, however, allegations of fraud must be "stated with
particularity."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/3
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in a pronounced jurisprudential shift, the Supreme Court severely pruned
back the reach of federal securities law.34 By contrast, state courts have taken
common-law fraud in the opposite direction. Overall, then, in contrast to
post-PSLRA federal courts, which require proof of knowing or intentional
conduct, state courts firmly pinion liability on a finding of recklessness.35
More importantly, while focusing on the relationship of the parties and
frequently the greedy motive of the defendant,36  something that
post-Hochfelder federal courts largely abandoned in favor of across-the-
board binary rules,37 many state courts lowered the required state of mind to
lack of reasonable care. The negligent misrepresentation cases are difficult to
categorize but often seem to involve superior access to information on the
defendant's part, or other ability of the defendant to control the destiny of the
plaintiff, the trust the plaintiff had in the defendant, the length or intended
permanence of the relationship and the potential benefit for the defendant
that could be garnered through an untruth or omission.
State courts have held employers liable to employees for mere negligent
misrepresentation.38 The relationship of insurer to insured may give rise to
such liability.39 A title company may be liable to a home buyer for negligent
misrepresentation.40 Several state courts have held liable broker-dealers who
34. In the Burger and Rehnquist eras, the Supreme Court decided 32 of 40 securities law cases
for defendants and, "in almost every one, significantly narrowed the reach of federal securities laws. In
one stretch, the Burger Court decided 15 of 16 consecutive securities cases for defendants and defense
interests." Branson, Gauntlet, supra note I, at 6 & nn.9-1 1. The Court's 41st opinion, United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), which upholds the misappropriation theory of insider trading, would
generally be regarded as a proplaintiff decision.
35. In an exhaustive study, Professor Kevin Johnson found that in 47 states and the District of
Columbia clear authority exists for fraud liability based upon recklessness. See Kevin R. Johnson,
Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 667, 700 (1991). In only one state, North Carolina, is there
clear authority to the contrary. In Meyers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385,
391 (N.C. 1988), the Supreme Court of North Carolina required a plaintiff to prove "both knowledge
and an intent to deceive" in fraud actions. Id.; see Johnson, supra, at 702 & n.144.
36. These were key factors in at least two federal circuits' pre-Hochfelder common-law based
analyses of the state of mind issue. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 1974); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). See generally Douglas M. Branson, Statutory
Securities Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder Era: The Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysis,
52 TUL. L. REv. 50 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 35, at 706-07 ("Before Hochfelder, some courts, encouraged
by academic commentators, emphasized the importance of the relationship between the parties in
determining whether a defendant had acted with the state of mind necessary for Section 10(b) liability.
After Hochfelder, the [federal] courts abandoned that endeavor.").
38. See, e.g., Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 380 (Alaska 1984); D'Ulisse-Cupo
v. Board of Dirs. of Notre Dame High Sch., 520 A.2d 217,223 (Conn. 1987).
39. See, e.g., Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 366, 367-68 (Pa. 1977); Moore v.
Kluthe & Lane Ins. Agency, 234 N.W.2d 260,264-65 (S.D. 1975).
40. See Chun v. Park, 462 P.2d 905,908-09 (Haw. 1969).
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made merely negligent statements,41 in contrast to post-Hochfelder federal
cases, which have required plaintiffs to prove that broker-dealers acted
42
recklessly or with intent.
Two well-recognized and overlapping categories of state law cases
crystallize this development. In negligent misrepresentation and constructive
fraud cases, state courts, focusing primarily upon relationship, permit
damages based merely upon a lack of reasonable care. State courts still
regard the relationship between the parties as important, particularly as to the
allegation and proof they require of plaintiffs on the state of mind issue.
43
C. Cautionary Words Versus Due Diligence: The PSLRA Versus
Common-Law Fraud
In addition, when recklessness (rather than mere negligence) is the state
of mind required, state courts make clear that a speaker is reckless not only
when she was consciously indifferent as to the truth of her statement, but also
when she had no sufficient basis or was indifferent as to the existence or not
of a basis to justify statements made.44 A leading authority finds that these
"no basis" or indifference to the extent of information cases satisfy the
common-law state of mind requirement
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 640 P.2d 453, 458-59
(Mont. 1982); see also, e.g., Gochnauer v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1048-51 (11th
Cir. 1987) (broker-dealer not liable under federal securities law but could still be held liable for
violation of Florida state law duty of care); Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
532 F. Supp. 480,485 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (broker not liable under federal law but could be held for both
compensatory and punitive damages on pendant state law claims).
42. Before broker-dealer cases submerged into arbitration, federal courts consistently required
proof of a high degree of recklessness. See, e.g., McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d
809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989) (broker-dealer case required proof of "'severe recklessness,"' that is,
"'highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care' (citations
omitted)); Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1984)
(broker-dealer case required proof of recklessness, defined as a "'lesser form of intent' rather than
'merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence' (citations omitted)).
43. This is an approach that leading, conservative commentators commended to the federal
courts, to no avail. See, e.g., David S. Ruder, Factors Determining the Degree of Culpability
Necessary for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws in Information Transmission Cases, 32 VASH.
& LEE L. REv. 571, 577 (1975) (arguing that courts should focus on the relationship between the
parties to ascertain the requisite state of mind); Bruce Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a Continuum of
Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206 (1970)
(similar).
44. See, e.g., Sovereign Pocohontas Co. v. Bond, 120 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Fausett & Co. v.
Bullard, 229 S.v.2d 490 (Ark. 1950).
45. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 21, § 107, at 742, concluding that under state law:
A defendant who asserts a fact as of his own knowledge, or so positively as to imply that he has
knowledge, under circumstances where he is aware that he will be so understood when he knows
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/3
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These no basis and indifference cases also arise frequently in the
securities area, in which offering circulars or press releases project future
economic performance without the benefit of any measure of due diligence. 6
Due diligence, of course, is a time-honored exercise in which attorneys and
issuers ensure that every substantive statement and projection in an offering
document has a demonstrable basis in reality. Often, a due diligence file will
backstop every statement and projection on multiple bases. If litigation
commences at a later time, defense counsel will use the due diligence file to
defeat claims of "pie in the sky projections" by the issuer, its officers and
others, and resolve the case by means of summary judgment or other
dispositive motion. The due diligence materials frequently will accompany
that motion to demonstrate multiple bases for every statement.
The PSLRA, however, contains a safe harbor for forward looking
statements. The PSLRA provision provides that if a statement is
"accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, '' 7 plaintiffs are denied
discovery and the court must dismiss allegations as to the false or misleading
nature of the statement when presenfed with a dispositive motion.48 There are
some exceptions, 49 and the safe harbor is limited to statements by or about
issuers that are reporting companies or, by virtue of IPOs, will become
reporting companies under the Exchange Act.
50
The effect of the PSLRA provision, as with stronger forms of the
judge-made bespeaks caution doctrine, is to substitute:
mere cautionary words for the due diligence traditionally associated
with preparation of statements in disclosure documents. Rather than
building a due diligence file that, through research, establishes more
than plausible, and often alternative, bases for making the statements
made in the documents, securities lawyers will plaster forward-
looking statements with cautionary warnings .... No incentive now
exists for hiring the traditional, classical securities lawyer who
quarterbacked the research and other effort necessary to do the due
that he does not in fact know whether what he says is true, is found to have the intent to deceive,
not so much as to the fact itself, but rather as to the extent of his information.
Id.
46. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson & Karl S. Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and the
Definition of "Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1082-83 (1993)
(containing examples of such cases).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(cXl)(AXi) (Supp. I 1996).
48. See id. § 77z-2(e)-(f).
49. Exceptions include blank check offerings, penny stock issuances, rollup offerings and going
private transactions. See id. § 77z-2(bX1)(B)-(E).
50. See id. § 77z-2(a)(1)-(4).
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diligence exercise. Instead, Congress has placed a premium on buying
and using ink by the barrel.'
A close examination of the state recklessness standard might, however,
provide a continuing incentive for due diligence exercises. Under evolving
notions of what constitutes the requisite state of mind, a speaker and those
who assist her may be held liable if they are proven to have been consciously
indifferent (reckless) as to the extent of information upon which they have
based forward looking or other substantive statements in offering documents,
press releases and so on, cautionary boilerplate to the contrary.
D. An Approximation ofPrivity
That is the good news for plaintiffs. The drawback is that the state court
focus on relationship in fraud cases, while not causing a regression to
common-law sorts of privity, does require either privity, a semblance of
privity or a duty to a foreseen rather than merely foreseeable plaintiff group.
That may render common-law fraud an inappropriate vehicle for some
claims. In the case of statements by officers of a publicly held corporation,
however, shareholders may well be able to claim that they are not only a
foreseeable group but the foreseen group that today's common-law fraud
requires as opposed to old-fashioned types of privity. Shareholders may well
allege the requisite relationship with the corporate officers, directors or
spokespersons responsible for the misleading prospectus, earnings forecast or
press release.
Old-fashioned common-law privity has, as its paradigm, passage of title
or similar direct dealing, a level of privity some commentators urged under
certain liability provisions of the federal securities laws.52 Common-law
privity, however, encompassed more. If "representations were made to the
complaintant, or with any expectation that they would come to, his
knowledge, or with any belief or reason to believe that they would induce
him to act in the matter in question," the common-law privity requirement
was satisfied.53
Today many state courts embrace Restatement (Second) of Torts section
552 which provides:
51. Branson, Gauntlet, supra note 1, at 35-36.
52. See Patricia O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921, 933 (1984); cf. Douglas M.
Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities Lavs-Charting the Proper Course, 65
OR. L. REv. 327, 344-46 (1986) [hereinafter Branson, Collateral Participant Liability (Federal)].
53. 9 STUART M. SPEISER Er AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:42, at 293 (1992).
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One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.1
4
The jurisdictions adopting this section are capable of holding defendants
liable under state law in the types of cases targeted by the PSLRA, namely
cases involving, misrepresentations, misleading statements and material
omissions by corporate officers, spokespersons and the corporation they
represent.55
E. Constructive Fraud
Another state law route to not only low (recklessness) but the lowest
(negligence) state of mind allegation and proof requirements is constructive
fraud.56 Experienced securities lawyers tell me that constructive fraud
allegations are extremely difficult to defend. Well-pled constructive fraud
allegations are difficult to knock out on summary judgment. Accordingly,
they enhance the value of a plaintiff's case considerably.57
Constructive fraud has been defined as "the breach of some legal or
equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent
because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure
public interests."58 As such, constructive fraud is nebulous and may be the
54. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 552(1) (1977). The section goes onto provide:
mhe liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a
limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that
he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.
Id. § 552(2)(a)-(b).
55. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087, 1163 (1996) ("a director, when he recommends
stockholder action, is acting 'in the course of his business' to supply information 'for the guidance of
others,' namely the 'limited group' consisting of the stockholders" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977))).
56. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that "the only difference between
common-law fraud and equitable [constructive] fraud is 'Chancery's willingness to provide a remedy
for negligent or innocent misrepresentations."' Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 472 n.4 (Del.
1992) (quoting Stephenson v. Capano Development, Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983)).
57. Telephone Interview with William O'Connor, member of Kightlinger & Gray (Nov. 18,
1997) (notes on file with the author).
58. Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1964) (conveyance to divorce attorney who
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
carte blanc for ajudge to do justice as she sees fit.
Traditionally, the "legal or equitable duty" had to arise from a fiduciary or
confidential relationship between the defendant and the group of which the
plaintiff was a member. 9 In the case of misrepresentations or omissions by
corporate officers and directors, then, a plaintiff might run afoul of the
traditional defense that the corporate official owes her duties solely to the
corporation and not any particular person within it.
60
Although the cases are not plentiful, recent state court decisions focus on
the "tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public
interests." 6' Thus, the Supreme Court of Vermont allowed a creditor to
recover from a second corporation, with whom the creditor had not dealt,
when the controlling shareholder had shifted funds, quite legitimately, from
the debtor corporation under the guise of administrative fees payable to the
second, parent corporation. 62 The court upheld constructive fraud claims in
which "a party in position of superior knowledge or influence intentionally
gains an unfair advantage at the expense of another person."63 Constructive
fraud lies "where a wrongful act injures another but is done without bad faith
or a malevolent purpose on the part of the perpetrator."64 The second
corporation, of course, had no fiduciary or confidential relationship to the
creditor.
Modem constructive fraud law emphasizes capacity to mislead as much
or more than the relationship between parties,65 as "[w]here a party, by his
words or conduct creates a false impression concerning serious impairments
or other important matters and subsequently fails to disclose relevant
also received cash fee from husband set aside as constructive fraud); see also 9 SPEISER ET AL., supra
note 53, § 32.10, at 227 ("Actual fraud must ... involve wilful deception, while constructive or legal
fraud may arise from the circumstances of the transaction or the relationship of the parties, without the
existence of fraudulent intent .... ).
59. See, e.g., Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 421 (Fla. 1927) ("The rule embraces both technical
fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist wherever one man trusts in and relies upon
another.... The relation and the duties involved in it need not be legal. It may be moral, social,
domestic or merely personal." (citation omitted)); Wells v. Wells, 150 N.E. 361, 365 (Ind. 1926)
(constructive fraud performed by son and son's attorney on aged father).
60. See, e.g., Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421, 425-26 (1902) (insider trading could not be
vindicated by selling shareholder because corporate insider's duty owed only to the corporation).
61. Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W. 2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1965) (citing 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 2 (1943)).
62. See Hardwick-Morrison Co. v. Albertsson, 605 A.2d 529 (Vt. 1992).
63. Id. at 53 1.
64. Id.
65. But see Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. 512 (1878).
An act or contract, though not originating in any evil design or contrivance to injure another, yet
tending to deceive and mislead, or violate private confidence, is a constructive fraud, equally
reprehensible with actual fraud, and prohibited by law.
Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
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factors. 6 6 Thus, the controlling shareholder of a corporation was held liable
on grounds of constructive fraud when he failed to volunteer to plaintiff
contractor that 1) a personal guarantee sought by the contractor had little
worth because of the guarantor's financial instability and 2) an escrow
arrangement remained unfunded.67 The court expressly held that in certain
circumstances no fiduciary or similar relationship would be required.68
Because of their capacity to mislead, promissory misrepresentations are
sometimes held to amount to constructive fraud. Thus, one Indiana court held
that a representation as to future action gives rise to constructive fraud if the
representation turned out to be false, the plaintiff relied upon the
representation to his detriment and the representation created an advantage
for the defendant in the transaction.69
Understanding constructive fraud is difficult. The theory is a nebulous,
result-oriented catchall creature of equity. But because of its emphasis on the
capacity to mislead rather than on relationships deemed fiduciary,
constructive fraud seems to hold promise as a plaintiff-oriented tool in state
court securities actions.
F. Relaxed Reliance Requirements?
A common-law fraud supplicant has to plead and prove reliance.
70
Reliance may be direct.' The supplicant may be able to show that she had
heard the misleading statement or has seen and read the misleading
72 7statements. Reliance may also be indirect.73 For example, the supplicant
could prove that she had relied upon a recommendation from her broker who,
in turn, had relied upon a research report prepared by a securities analyst
who, in turn, saw an offending press release or disclosure document such as
an annual report.74
66. Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., 749 P.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Mont. 1988).
67. See id. at 1060.
68. See id. at 1065.
69. See Dominion Invs. v. Yasechko, 767 F. Supp. 1460, 1470 (N.D. Ind. 1991) ("constructive
fraud is fraud that arises by operation of law from conduct which, if sanctioned by law, would secure
an unconscionable advantage"). Furthermore, a promise made with no intention to perform at the time
the promise is given rises from breach of contract to actual, and not merely constructive, fraud. See
KEETON El AL., supra note 21, § 109, at 763 ("[A] promise made without the intent to perform it is
held to be a sufficient basis for an action of deceit." (footnotes omitted)).
70. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 108, at 749-50.
71. See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 53, §§ 32.50-.52, at 301-09.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that plaintiff who made a
stock purchasing decision based on a newspaper item containing information from a misleading annual
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The fraud on the market theory is a reliance substitute, especially valuable
in cases in which the plaintiff is unable to show either direct or indirect
reliance. The theory accepts two premises. First, while investors may not
have relied upon a misleading statement, they do rely on the integrity of
market prices. Second, because the market is efficient, the misleading
statement will have caused share prices to lose congruence with the reality of
what has actually occurred in a corporation or other issuer. The fraud on the
market theory then sets up a presumption of reliance that a defendant may
rebut, for example, by demonstrating that the market in which the shares
traded was not open and well-developed. That is, the defendant can put
plaintiff back to square one on the reliance issue by raising serious doubts as
to the efficiency of the market.
In Basic v. Levinson,75 the United States Supreme Court accepted the
fraud on the market theory. In the area of common-law fraud, the issue is
whether state courts will follow. To date, the picture is mixed.
In a leading case, Mirkin v. Wasserman, 7the plaintiffs claimed that they
purchased shares of Maxicare, Inc. "in reliance upon the integrity of the
securities market and the securities offering process, and the fidelity, integrity
and superior knowledge of the defendants." 77 The Supreme Court of
California held that the fraud on the market theory is not available in
common-law fraud actions.78 The court emphasized that plaintiff investors
have other remedies which do presume reliance, including federal remedies
and state blue sky law causes of action.79
Because the PSLRA and other proposed legislation narrow plaintiff
investors' remedies, the issue should perhaps be decided differently today.
Nonetheless, a number of decisions have refused to accept the fraud on the
market reliance substitute in common-law fraud cases.80 The Delaware
Supreme Court's opinion in Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc.8 1 is representative of
those decisions. It is an exercise in mechanical jurisprudence: common-law
report stated a sufficient claim of reliance), vacated as moot, 457 U.S. 1027 (1982).
75. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
76. 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
77. Id. at 570.
78. See id. at 584.
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., In re One Bancorp Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 526, 533 (D. Me. 1991); In re Consol.
Capital Sec. Litig., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,238 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
1990); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1298 (D.N.J. 1989); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117
F.RD. 75, 81 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 412 (N.D. III. 1987); Gavron
v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 115 F.R.D. 318, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F.
Supp. 1128, 1151-52 (D. Or. 1984); Glosser v. Cellcor, Inc., 1995 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,708
(Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 1995).
81. 611A.2d467 (Del. 1992).
[VOL. 76:509
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/3
1998] SECURITIES LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 523
fraud plaintiffs must prove reliance and that is simply the way the law is. The
opinion lacked any policy or other analysis.
82
A minority of courts have allowed plaintiffs to utilize fraud on the market
in common-law fraud cases, noting, "An investor who buys or sells stock at
the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price...
[and the theory] is no less persuasive in a negligent misrepresentation case
involving a securities market. 's3 These courts recognize the theory regardless
of whether the stock is traded OTC or on a recognized exchange, as long as
the market is efficient
8 4
Acceptance of the fraud on the market theory is crucial in cases involving
all but the smallest publicly held corporations. At an early stage of the
litigation, defendants' demand for individual proofs on the reliance issue may
defeat class certification. 85 Defendant issuer will argue that "questions of fact
and law common to the members of the class [do not] predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members. 86 In a smaller class action,
minitrials on the reliance issue may make the class action manageable.
Alternatively, in a group action each of the named plaintiffs may take the
stand to offer individual proofs on the reliance issue.
Common-law fraud has evolved in the decades since Congress enacted
the securities laws, but it still has an Achilles heal. The weakness is that,
under the prevailing view, plaintiffs must plead and prove reliance without
the aid of the fraud on the market theory reliance substitute. Only when state
courts make a breakthrough on the reliance issue will common-law fraud
become useful in the type of lawsuit which the PSLRA aims to govern.
82. See id. at 474-75.
83. In re Healthcare Serv. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,374 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 1993).
84. See, e.g., Hurley v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp. 27, 33-34 (D. Mass. 1989); see also, e.g., Minpeco,
S.A. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Boardwalk Marketplace See. Litig.,
122 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D. Conn. 1988); In re United Energy Corp. See. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 254-55 (C.D.
Cal. 1988).
85. See, e.g., In re One Bancorp Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 526, 533 (D. Me. 1991) ("proof of
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively ... prevented
respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would have
overwhelmed the common ones" (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988)));
Garvron v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 115 F.R.D. 318, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("common-law fraud count
raises numerous issues which are personal to each plaintiff and are, therefore, uncommon to the class
as a whole'[; s]ince individual issues, not common issues, predominate, certification is denied"
(quoting Ungar v. Dunkin Donuts, 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975)); see also, e.g., Gaffin v. Teledyne,
Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 474-75 (Del. 1992) (finding reversible error for chancery court not to have
decertified class in case oflequitable fraud).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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II. SOMETHING NEW: THE FIDUCIARY DUTY TO DISCLOSE, FORMERLY
KNOWN AS THE DUTY OF CANDOR
The duty formerly known as candor has evolved but not without twists,
turns and a few setbacks. In its present form, the duty probably dates from
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.87
One commentator notes, 88 somewhat erroneously, "The evolution of judicial
treatment of the director's disclosure duty has received little systematic
attention.' 89 Since Lynch, the Supreme Court of Delaware has rendered
twenty or so decisions in which this duty figured prominently.
The Delaware Supreme Court has, however, a habit of occasionally
letting the genie out of the bottle before first ascertaining the ramifications.
The court did so with its well-known decision, Schnell v. Chris-Craft, Inc.,90
holding that "inequitable action does not become permissible simply because
it is legally possible."9' Subsequently, the court has spent over twenty-five
years fleshing out the Schnell doctrine's contours, pruning it back here and
there when overly zealous plaintiffs' counsel attempted to use it as a
universal solvent.
92
Similarly, the court has seemingly backpedaled with so-called Revlon
analysis in which the court held that if a corporation's sale is inevitable, the
"directors' role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for stockholders. '93 In
subsequent decisions, for example, the court has narrowed dramatically the
occasions when a corporation actually is "for sale" and Revlon duties are
implicated.
94
87. 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (corporations and their directors had a fiduciary duty of
"complete candor [under which] completeness, not adequacy, is both the norm and the mandate").
88. See Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1096.
89. For systematic discussion of directors' disclosure duty, see DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 10.07, at 562-64 (1993) ("Emergence of a New Duty-The Duty of
Candor-Disclosure").
90. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1977).
91. Id.at439.
92. For a description of the evolution of the Schnell doctrine, see BRANSON, supra note 89,
§ 2.04, at 80-83; Douglas M. Branson, The Chancellor's Foot in Delaware: Schnell and its Progeny,
14 J. Corp. L. 515 (1989).
93. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
94. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (finding no
duty under Revlon when corporation enters into initial merger agreement); Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989) (finding that Revlon does not require that every corporate change of
control be preceded by bidding contest); Invanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1987) (holding that Revlon does not apply unless sale of company in inevitable). But see
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1993) (stating that Revlon
does not hold that "inevitable dissolution or 'break-up' is necessary" before directors can be subjected
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The Delaware Supreme Court seemed to sense that the duty of candor
was getting out of control when it rechristened the duty with the more prosaic
"duty of disclosure." In Stroud v. Grace,95 the court refused to apply the
doctrine to directors' failure to disclose the effect of a number of proposed
bylaw changes. 96 The court emphasized that the duty of candor, or complete
candor, does not establish more extensive disclosure duties under state law
than are required by the federal securities laws.9 7 The court also retrenched in
spirit:
Plaintiffs allege a breach of the "duty of candor." Preliminarily we
note that the term "duty of candor" does not import a unique or special
rule of disclosure. It represents nothing more than the well-recognized
proposition that directors of Delaware corporations are under a
fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information
within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action.... Thus,
it is more appropriate for our courts to speak of a duty of disclosure
based on a materiality standard rather than the unhelpful terminology
that has crept into Delaware court decisions as a "duty of candor."
98
Despite the Delaware court's dissatisfaction, the few other courts that have
dealt with the doctrine seem to find the "candor" terminology helpful.99
Whatever the label, from plaintiffs' point of view the doctrine offers
several inducements for pursuing a state law cause of action. Nothing in this
world ever is simple, however, and this exposition also must describe the
refinements and cutbacks the Supreme Court of Delaware has decreed as the
doctrine has evolved. Here, then, are four benefits, three potential drawbacks
and one final small benefit to a state law duty of disclosure/candor litigation
theory.
to heightened judicial scrutiny). See generally Lawrence Cunningham & Charles Yablon, Delaware
Fiduciary Duty After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (And the End of Revlon Duties?), 49
Bus. LA W. 1593 (1995).
95. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
96. See id. at 84.
97. Musings on this subject were made in, among other things, Donald E. Pease, Delavare's
Disclosure Rule: The "Complete Candor" Standard, Its Application, and Why Sue in Delaware, 14
DEL. J. CORP. L. 445,447,452 (1989).
98. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84; cf. Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1097 n.36 ("Whether the
substitution of the phrase 'duty of disclosure' for 'duty of complete candor' has done more for
doctrinal clarity than new clothes did for the emperor is unclear.").
99. See, e.g., Persinger v. Carmazzi, 441 S.E.2d 646, 652 (W. Va. 1994) ("Part of fair dealing is
the obvious duty of candor.").
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1. Benefit: Virtual Per Se Rule ofDamages
The doctrine received a boost in the case of In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. 100
There, the court held that violation of the duty gives rise to an independent
right to damages.10 Justice Andrew Moore wrote, "In Delaware existing law
and policy have evolved into a virtual per se rule of damages for breach of
the fiduciary duty of disclosure."'1 2 Any disclosure claim is at a minimum
worth one to two dollars per share. 0 3 In a mid-cap publicly held corporation,
with fifteen to twenty million shares outstanding, one to two dollars per share
in damages provides the potential of a common fund creating adequate
incentive to litigate.
2. Benefit: Low State ofMind-Strict Liability or Liability for Mere
Negligence
Early commentators noted that then-existent Delaware candor cases said
nothing about state of mind.' °4 Those commentators thought that the liability
might be strict' 0 5 Later, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that that the duty
is "an obligation that has been characterized as a derivative of the duties of
care and loyalty."'1 6 The duty of care would require at least negligence for
liability.
One commentator suggests that the court may impose strict liability if the
100. 634A.2d319 (Del. 1993).
101. Seeid.at334.
102. Id. at 333. Seemingly, the Delaware court did great violence to that principle in its recent
decision, Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135 (Del. 1997), but in reality it seems to
have left the principle undisturbed. The Loudon court would not permit damages for disclosure
violations in election of directors but did note that "[t]here may ... be a potential damage remedy
where the misstatement or omission implicates the stockholders' economic or voting rights." Id. at
138. Continuing, the court held, "But there is noperse doctrine imposing damage liability on directors
in a disclosure case absent these elements." Id. That apparently is the meaning of the court's later
statement, "The dictum in Tn-Star is confined to the facts of that case." Id. at 147.
103. See Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1158 & n.322.
104. See, e.g., J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 9.03, at
9-20 (2d ed. Supp. 1995) ("Delaware cases have not explicitly imposed a state of mind requirement for
violations of the duty of candor")
105. See, e.g., Pease, supra note 97, at 486 ("Under the Delaware cases ... the plaintiff need not
prove that the flawed disclosure was caused by either scienter of negligence."). The author concluded
that "Delaware has a strict liability standard." Id. at 487; see also Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1093
n. 18 (noting 12 Delaware candor cases in which no mention is made of culpability).
106. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995). In Arnold v. Society
for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) ("Arnold P), the court asked for briefing on
whether the duty was derivative or was an independent "free-standing fiduciary duty." Hamermesh,
supra note 55, at 1139. However, in its second opinion, Arnold, 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996) ("Arnold
iF), the court failed to clarify the issue. See Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1140.
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relief sought is an injunction against, or recision of, a transaction that was
approved based upon misleading or incomplete disclosure.10 7 Also, if
directors are self-dealing, then strict liability also should apply.
0 8
If, however, the directors made a recommendation concerning a takeover
bid, urged shareholder approval of a merger or urged a shareholder vote in
favor of a change in corporate governance rules, liability for damages should
exist only if the directors failed to take due care in presenting the material
information to the shareholders. 109 An essential element of duty of care
violations is proof of actual damages. 110 The Delaware duty of
disclosure/candor has a virtual per se rule of damages. Equivalence of the
duty of disclosure with the duty of care, then, is not consistent with the
Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Tri-Star Pictures and subsequent
cases.
3. Benefit: Other Types of Relief and Ensuing Leverage
A possible remedy for a violation of the duty of disclosure is an
injunction against the transaction." l Because of the directors' incomplete
disclosure, shareholders have approved the transaction. A federal court,
applying Delaware law, has rescinded a transaction, due to violations of the
duty of disclosure" 2 A leading commentator argues that injunctive relief,
including recision of an election of directors, may be warranted if the court
finds duty of disclosure violations."13 Such an injunction often represents a
large bargaining chip for shareholders' class counsel, who may utilize that
injunction to increase the settlement offered to the shareholders.
4. Benefit: No Preemption
All parties in the proposed "Uniform Standards" legislative debate,
plaintiffs' bar, SEC, accounting profession and Silicon Valley, seem willing
107. See Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1162 ("On what theory of liability, then, would such a
preliminary injunction rest? The only intellectually satisfying answer is some strict duty of disclosure,
akin to that posited for trustees .... " (footnotes omitted)).
108. See id. at 1100; see also id. at 1102 ("Where director self-interest is absent, there is no need
for strict liability or disgorgement-type remedies to discourage fiduciary opportunism...
109. Seeid. at I101.
110. See BRANSON, supra note 89, § 6.14, at 291-95.
Ill. See, e.g.. Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 278 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(awarding an injunction against the implementation of a dual class capitalization plan).
112. See Edelman v. Salomon, 559 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (D. Del. 1983) (nullifying amendment of
articles of incorporation eliminating cumulative voting).
113. See Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1170-71.
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to create an exception for the Delaware common-law duty of disclosure.' 1 4
Although state securities law class actions would be preempted by the
legislation, as a corporate law fiduciary principle, the duty of
disclosure/candor will remain available for state court class action litigation.
5. Possible Disadvantage: No Direct Corporate Liability
In corporate and securities litigation, the most readily accessible deep
pocket is likely to be the corporation. The Delaware Supreme Court has held,
however, that the individual directors, not the corporation, are liable for duty
of disclosure violations.'15
There is a division of authority as to whether the corporation itself owes
fiduciary duties to its shareholders. 16 In jurisdictions holding that
corporations may owe fiduciary duties, a court may find corporate liability
for violations of the duty of disclosure."17 Arguably, some of the duties a
corporation owes to its shareholders are, and should be, fiduciary in
character, the duty of disclosure should be among them."
18
Although relegated to director liability in Delaware and jurisdictions
following its jurisprudence, class counsel may find an indirect means to the
corporate pocket. The corporation may be required to indemnify directors. If
the corporation has directors' and officers' liability insurance, the coverage
amounts will often fall short of the amount of the liability. At least on an
indirect basis, indemnification provisions will "kick in" to render the
corporation liable.
Additionally, if class counsel is able to obtain an injunction against a
transaction, the leverage gained may aid in negotiation and creation of a
common fund benefiting the shareholders." 9
6. Possible Disadvantage: Directors May Be Free ofLiability Due to
Exculpation Provision in Articles of Incorporation
Since 1986, Delaware law has provided that a corporation may include in
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Bill to Federalize Securities Class Suits
CouldErase Important State Corporate Law, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1512 (Oct. 31, 1997).
115. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp., Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539-40 (Del. 1996).
116. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 80, § 10.06, at 559-61.
117. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.)
(holding the corporation to a fiduciary duty when repurchasing shares from employee-shareholder);
Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1194-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that corporation itself has state
law fiduciary duty of disclosure).
118. See BRANSON, supra note 89, § 10.06, at 561.
119. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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its articles:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
... for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,
provided that such a provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director: (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders.1
2 0
Because the duty of disclosure/candor was thought to be based upon the
duties of care and loyalty, 121 it was thought that exculpatory provisions might
not relieve directors of money damage liability. In Zirn v. VLI Corp.,122 the
court began with the proposition that the directors had a duty to "disclose to
shareholders all material facts bearing upon a merger vote aris[ing]under the
duties of care and loyalty."' 123 The court concluded that under the authorizing
statute, the corporation could not exculpate its directors from liability. 24
The holding of Zirn was short-lived. A year later, the court in Arnold v.
Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.125  read the Delaware statute as
unambiguously allowing exculpation for duty of disclosure/candor
violations, at least if no self dealing or "intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of the law" was involved.
26
In the Delaware court's latest pronouncement, Delaware Chief Justice
Veasey, attempting to reconcile Zirn and Arnold, noted that a corporation's
"certificate of incorporation may eliminate the availability of money
damages."'127 If disclosure violations result from good faith errors by the
directors, Delaware law relieves them of money damage liability.'
28
In other jurisdictions, such as the thirty-five states that follow the Model
Business Corporation Act, 29 the authorizing statute is broader. The statute
permits exculpation for directors from all liabilities to the corporation or its
shareholders with two exceptions: the court can require the director to pay
"the amount of a financial benefit received," or the court can hold the
120. DEL CODEANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1996).
121. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
122. 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993).
123. Id. at 778.
124. See id. at 783.
125. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
126. See id. at 1286-88; see also Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1140.
127. Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 141 n.20 (Del. 1997) (citing Zirn and
Arnold as having identical holdings).
128. See id. at 142 n.27.
129. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act:
Death Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 259-60 (1993) (noting that the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act is basis for corporate law of 35 states).
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director liable for "an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or its
shareholders."130 Corporations that fully utilize the breadth of the statute may
virtually eliminate duty of disclosure/candor liability for their directors.
Therefore, in litigation, class counsel would be relegated to the remedies of
injunction and recision and whatever leverage those remedies may give her.
7. Possible Disadvantage: Limited Circumstances in Which the Duty
of Disclosure Applies
Many cases involve a misleading or incomplete press release, containing,
for example, an earnings forecast or progress report on a new product line.
Other nondisclosures or misleading statements can occur in the context of the
directors' annual election. At its broadest, the duty of disclosure seemed to be
a route to a state law remedy for these shareholder injuries.
In Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co.,t3t a corporate press release allegedly
exaggerated the benefits of a defensive restructuring management proposed
in response to a takeover bid. Vice Chancellor Berger held that corporate
directors, as fiduciaries, had an obligation "to honestly disclose all material
facts when they undertake to give out statements about the business to
stockholders."' 32 Therefore, the class complaint for damages survived a
motion to dismiss.
33
Chief Justice Veasey cut back on the doctrine's reach in Loudon v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,t34 where the defendant company failed to
disclose, in its annual solicitation for the election of directors, the well-
publicized "troubles" ADM and its chairman Dwayne Andreas had
encountered. 35 The court clearly held that the duty of disclosure, applied in
conjunction with the court's concomitant "virtual per se rule of damages for
breach of the duty of disclosure, does not apply to nondisclosures in the
election of directors."'
36
Standing alone, the duty of disclosure does not require a slate of directors
seeking election to engage in "self-flagellation" and "draw legal conclusions
implicating [themselves] in a breach of fiduciary duty ... prior to a formal
130. Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 2.20(b)(4).
131. 18 DEL. I. CORP. L. 330 (Del. Ch. 1992).
132. Id. at 336 (citing Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 71 (1969)).
133. Seeid. at338.
134. 700 A.2d 135 (Del. 1997).
135. See id. at 138-39. These troubles included an FBI investigation of price fixing allegations,
resignation of a director, the commencement of various class actions against the corporation and its
directors, appointment of a special litigation committee and various corporate actions taken against a
former corporate officer. See id.
136. Id. at 141 (citing In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993)).
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adjudication of the matter."' 137 Indeed, Chief Justice Veasey states the
proposition as a rule of law: "the self-flagellation rule."
138
Loudon may eliminate the state law disclosure duty cause of action in the
press release as well as in the election of directors context. 139 The case seems
to limit the damage remedy to a "transaction that has in turn caused
impairment to the economic or voting rights of stockholders," 140 echoing a
leading commentator who urges that the duty does not apply at all to "public
statements not intended on their face to elicit or counsel stockholder
action."'14' That commentator elaborates:
At most, directors and officers who issue press releases or other public
corporate statements have the market generally, and not the
stockholders, as ordinarily intended objects or beneficiaries of the
information.... Nothing in the law sets up directors as objects of
stockholder reliance or sources of recommendations to stockholders,
from which an all-encompassing fiduciary duty of continuous
disclosure might be inferred.1
42
Nonetheless, a fairly wide, although not unlimited, field of play exists
upon which the duty of disclosure may operate. The field of play includes
disclosures regarding proposed changes in corporate governance rules. 143 The
field includes disclosures made in a Schedule 14D-9 advising shareholders
on a third-party tender offer.144 The field includes omissions in a going
private transaction initiated by a parent corporation.1 45 It includes misleading
disclosures made in an information statement distributed by a parent
corporation in a short form merger.146 And, it includes nondisclosures or
misrepresentations when directors themselves are purchasing stock.
147
137. Id. at 143 (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)).
138. Id. at 145.
139. There still is a state law cause of action for fraud in the election of directors that requires
pleading and proof of knowing or intentional conduct. See BRANSON, supra note 89, § 2.02, at 74-75
(prevailing state law fraud standard contrasted with negligence standard under the federal proxy rules).
140. Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del. 1997) (emphasis added).
141. Hamermesh, supra note 55, at 1173.
142. Id. at 1173-74 (footnotes omitted).
143. See Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476,480 (Del. 1989).
144. See Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., 519 A.2d 116, 121 (Del. Ch. 1986).
145. See Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112 (Del. 1992).
146. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
147. Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) ("one possessing superior
knowledge may not mislead any stockholder by use of corporate information to which the latter is not
privy"), and Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949) (director or officer must account to
the corporation for all profit derived from use of inside information derived through his position), with
Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. Ch. 1960) ("directors generally do not occupy a fiduciary
positioin vis A vis individual stockholders in direct personal dealings [except] in special cases where
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8. Benefit: A Return to Mere Notice Pleading
In contrast to claims under the PSLRA, state law duty of disclosure
claims may be plead as in any other civil case, at least according to one
eminent source:
In asserting direct claims, as distinct from stockholder derivative
claims, the complaint need give only general notice of the claim
asserted. To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, plaintiff
need only provide a well-pleaded "short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" A requirement that
the pleader state facts "with particularity" is reserved for derivative
stockholder claims under Chancery Rule 23.1 and for fraud or mistake
claims under Rule 9(b). We see no reason to depart from the general
pleading rules when alleging duty of disclosure violations.14
8
The real benefit of state law is the liberal pleading requirements.
Compared with pleading requirements under the PSLRA, as interpreted by a
majority of federal judges, 149 the pleading requirements for a violation of the
directors' duty of disclosure are minimal.
III. SOMETHING BORROWED-SECONDARY LIABILITY (AIDING AND
ABETTING) FOR BREACHES OF STATE LAW FIDUCIARY DUTY
In federal securities law actions, secondary liability is visited upon
secondary defendants, if at all, because someone else, the primary violator,
has violated the securities laws. Plaintiffs often name as codefendants those
collateral participants who knowingly, or recklessly, rendered substantial
assistance to the primary violator in perpetration of the fraud or registration
violations alleged. Collateral participants include corporate officers and
directors, general partners of a limited partnership, accountants and
accounting firms, banks and business consultants, attorneys, celebrity
spokespersons and so on. Collateral participants may be, and frequently are,
primarily liable if, for example, they themselves uttered misrepresentations,
participated actively in statements made by others or had a direct hand in
"selling the deal."' 50 More frequently, however, plaintiffs are able only to
advantage is taken of inside information").
148. Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
149. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Branson, Collateral Participant Liability (Federal), supra note 52, at 329-35.
The significance of the collateral participant's involvement in the sales process is due to the Supreme
Court's rejection of the "substantial factor" test for determining seller status in section 12 liability
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allege that collateral participants are liable, if at all, secondarily. Federal law
in the last several years has, however, drastically curtailed both plaintiffs'
ability and motivation to do so.'
51
Under SEC Rule l0b-5, aiding and abetting was the principal theory of
secondary liability plaintiffs utilized. In Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank,152 however, the Supreme Court held that aiding and abetting liability
cannot exist under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5
thereunder.
Plaintiffs often join a number of collateral participants. Plaintiffs do so
because, at least in smaller offerings, the issuer itself has become judgment
proof. Regardless of whether the issuer is judgment proof or not, plaintiffs
also name collateral participants and then attempt to reach relatively quick
settlements with those collateral participants who have less culpability. With
those settlements, plaintiffs are better able to finance their continuing efforts
to hold liable those defendants plaintiffs perceive to be more culpable.
153
Just as Central Bank drastically curtailed plaintiffs' ability to pursue
collateral participants, the PSLRA drastically curtails the motivation for
doing so. Before the PSLRA, plaintiffs were able to achieve early settlements
with some defendants by using the threat of joint and several liability as a
"hammer." A less culpable individual, say, five percent responsible, could be
held liable for all ten, twenty or thirty million dollars in damages to a plaintiff
class or to a group of named plaintiffs. That defendant had a powerful
incentive to take an early exit by way of settlement if plaintiffs offered
one. 1
54
In a section sensationally titled "Reduction of Coercive Settlements,""'
the PSLRA eliminates joint and several liability except in cases in which the
plaintiff is able to prove knowing conduct. A scheme of comparative fault
cases. See Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); see also Branson, Gauntlet, supra note 1, at 7-9.
151. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622
(1988); see also Branson, Gauntlet, supra note 1, at 5-13.
152. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
153. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 811 & n. I (9th Cir. 1981)
(eight individual, four corporate and I-XX Doe defendants); McFarland v. Memorex, 493 F. Supp. 631
(ND. Cal. 1980) (42 defendants including accountants and their firms, issuer's officers and directors,
three banks and 11 other individuals). The grandparent of them all must be In re Washington Public
Power Supply Systems Litigation, 19 F.3rd 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) (200 defendants including 88
participating utilities, individual directors of utilities, law firms, New York bond counsel, engineers
and engineering firms and others). See generally Branson, Collateral Participant Liability (Federal),
supra note 52, at 327-28.
154. The process is described in, among other things, Branson, Gauntlet, supra note 1, at 37-38,
and in Branson, Collateral Participant Liability (State), supra note 6, at 1035-37.
155. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §§ 201-03, 109 Stat.
737, 758-62.
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
has been introduced in place of the joint and several liability traditional in the
securities area. The result is that plaintiffs may never file some suits because
of the reduced possibility of settlement. A second effect is that "[o]nce suit is
brought, the dry spell will be longer-from the filing of the complaint to the
courthouse steps, the possibility of settling cases along the way is vastly
reduced."'1
56
State law, however, preserves some, perhaps even much of plaintiffs'
ability and motivation to prosecute culpable collateral participants. This
preservation is partially achieved through state securities law. 5 7 But the state
common law of corporations and other business associations also helps
significantly.
Aiding and abetting allegations under state corporate law, then, are the
"something borrowed" of this Article, although at least the early state law
decisions did not seem, consciously anyway, to be looking to federal
securities law for their inspiration. 15 In an early decision, without reference
to federal securities law, the Delaware Vice Chancellor held:
The legal theory [of aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty] is
sound. The directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship
... [a]nd one who knowingly joins with any fiduciary, including
corporate officials, in a breach of his obligation is liable to the
beneficiaries of the trust relationship.15
9
Four years later, the Delaware Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on
aiding and abetting, approving the statement that "if outside experts, on
whom many must depend for the integrity of corporate affairs, knowingly
conspire with self-dealing fiduciaries to defraud those very persons who in
practicality must rely on their advice, it is difficult to see why... trust
principles ... should not apply ... ,,160 Recently, the theory that an attorney
could be held liable for aiding and abetting violations of fiduciary duty was
accepted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.16' Recent cases in Virginia 162
156. Branson, Gauntlet, supra note 1, at 38.
157. See Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional, supra note 8, at 115-22 ("Turn to State
Securities Law"); see also Branson, Collateral Participant Liability (State), supra note 6, at 1037-67.
158. Later state law cases that do examine and borrow from federal aiding and abetting cases
include Blow v. Shaughnessy, 364 S.E.2d 444, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Greenfield v. National
Medical Care, Inc., 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 737 (Del. Ch. 1986).
159. Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349,351 (Del. Ch. 1972).
160. Laventhol, Krestein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170 (Del. 1976)
(holding that the time bar to an action against the aider and abetter would be laches rather than the
shorter statute of limitations under the principle ofBovay v. H.M. Byllesby& Co., 38 A.2d 808, 820-21
(Del. Ch. 1944)).
161. See Alleco, Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 665 A.2d 1038, 1049 (Md. 1995)
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and Oregon' 63 accept or apply the concept of collateral participants' aiding
and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty.
64
Many securities cases involve self dealing, or even outright theft, by
partners, general partners, corporate officers or promoters, all of whom are
fiduciaries under state law. Often, the defalcations or acts of self dealing are
assisted by collateral participants who know of the wrongdoing and turn a
blind eye, or even aid in creating a false appearance or impression. Aiding
and abetting under state corporate or partnership law thus may be a valuable
tool for class or group counsel in securities cases.
The drawback to state law aiding and abetting jurisprudence, as it has
developed, is that state courts universally require that the secondary
defendant knew that the primary violator was violating the law and rendered
substantial assistance. 165 Federal securities aiding and abetting, when it did
exist, generally held that reckless conduct, at least of the conscious disregard
sort, satisfied the state of mind requirement' 66 Nonetheless, aiding and
abetting-with knowing conduct as the state of mind element-is better than
no aiding and abetting at all, which is the current situation under federal law.
Thus, in some cases in which the issuer is judgment proof and collateral
participants are culpable, or in any case in which culpability is relatively
clear, state law may provide a substitute for what the Supreme Court and the
PSLRA took away. In some of the disclosure cases, in which corporate
spokespersons sought shareholder action or inaction through misleading
statements or documents, the fiduciary duty of disclosure and candor,
cobbled together with aiding and abetting allegations against secondary
defendants, may be an alternative.
67
(finding, however, that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege primary violation).
162. See Tysons Toyota, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 45 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 1994), available in
1994 WL 717598 (unpublished table decision) (deciding case under Virginia law).
163. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1075 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (accepting the concept
of "aiding and assisting" but not holding liable attorney who prepared documents and rendered advice
only after majority shareholders formed intention to squeeze plaintiff out of corporation).
164. A different secondary liability theory was accepted by a court in Rome Industries, Inc. v.
Johnson, 415 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). The court approved a liability theory that, by assisting a
wrongdoing corporate officer, collateral participant could be found liable for tortiously interfering with
the implied contract, that is, fiduciary duty, between the corporate officer and the corporation.
165. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 & n.33 (Del. 1988);
Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 131 (Del. Ch. 1986); Penn Mart Realty Co. v.
Becker, 298 A.2d 349,351 (Del. Ch. 1972); Blow v. Shaughnessy, 364 S.E.2d 444,447 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988).
166. See, e.g., Ruder, supra note 43, at 575-77.
167. Of course, even the marginal utility of such a combination may be chiseled away unless
proposed "Uniform Standards" legislation contains a "carve out" or exception for the Delaware duty of
disclosure jurisprudence but at present that seems unlikely. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As much as I am a cheerleader for state law and state courts, the research
and writing of this Article have convinced me that, at best, state law is an
imperfect substitute for what the reformers have taken away. What they have
taken away is a large portion of the ability to vindicate wrongdoing by
publicly held corporations, their officers, directors and spokespersons, and
those who assist them.
On the state level, common-law fraud has evolved, but surprisingly not
much, and the reliance element remains a sticking point in filling the gap.
The Delaware duty of disclosure and candor once demonstrated fairly broad
promise but, as with the Schnell doctrine or so-called Revlon analysis, the
Delaware Supreme Court is chipping away, not reshaping but retrenching,
stuffing the "genie" back into the bottle. State law aiding and abetting
violations cover some lost ground but proof that collateral participants
actually knew of wrongdoing, whether by direct or circumstantial proof, is
difficult.
The last part of the marital metaphor in the title of this Article is the
"something blue." The "blue" infects those practitioners and academics,
including myself, who believe that securities law and litigation have an
important role to play in making injured parties whole and, ultimately, in the
process of encouraging capital formation. The reformers have gone too far-
the pendulum has been pushed too far into the extreme.
State law has a role to play but, for the most part, that role will be
confined to exempt transactions, small public offerings and similar small to
mid-sized deals. The reformers have compromised our "capable and ...
majestic federal courts,"'168 which are now relegated to administering a
complex, detailed "add-on" code of civil procedure (the PSLRA) designed to
neutralize the great securities legislation of the New Deal and to foil federal
judges from doing substantial justice in big or important cases. There's no R
& B-no rhythm-it's not "something blue"--it's pretty much "all blues."
168. Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional, supra note 8, at 125.
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